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ABSTRACT
JOHN RYAN SPEIGHTS: On the Ethics of Human Genetic Engineering
(Under the direction of Robert Westmoreland)

In this paper I propose a guideline that we may use to determine when it is ethical
to take advantage of the technology that we call human genetic engineering. I first clarify
the purpose of the paper by explaining the science behind the technology, defining much
of the debate in the process. In short, manufactured DNA is introduced into the human
genome for the purpose of modifying the expression of the genes and the person that they
produce. I indicate that this is a value theory paper rather than a detailed policy paper.
This is significant because it merely addresses what is ethical, and not what is easily
enforceable through regulation. Given this, I propose that it is ethical to undertake genetic
engineering of human embryos in cases of medical disease or defect and unethical to do
so for cosmetic purposes. I recite two prominent ethical theories in philosophy, Kantian
ethics and utilitarianism, and use these theories to judge my proposed guideline. By
showing how my theory is consistent with two radically different views on ethics, I prove
the strength of my theory as a good principle on how to ethically use genetic engineering
on humans.
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INTRODUCTION
As technology advances at a rapid rate, it strains our intuitive understanding
of what is ethical. New issues that we have never before considered are becoming
the definitive issues of our time. Intimidating and perplexing though these issues
may be, they require us to carefully and sympathetically examine our values. We
must use the best arguments that we have available to reconcile our positions on
these new issues with our ethics. One such issue is human genetic engineering. This
technology holds the potential for people to become their own creators in a way that
has never before been possible. Before we pursue the opportunity to alter the DNA
blueprint of human life, we should pause to consider the appropriate uses of this
new power. Some argue forcefully that a permanent ban on the modification of the
human genome is necessary; others say that research into this technology should be
encouraged and well funded. There are also opinions that speak to a moderate and
regulated approach. In this thesis I will use two established ethical theories, Kantian
ethics and utilitarianism, to judge the veracity of my proposed guideline for this
technology's use: It is ethical to undertake genetic engineering ofhuman embryos in
coses ofmedical disease or defect and unethical to do sofor cosmetic purposes.

1

I. THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN GENETIC ENGINEERING
Before one defends a complex proposition, he must clarify important terms.
In respect to this thesis, it is equally prudent for me to explain the science implied
by the term human genetic engineering(HGE). In this paper, by HGEI mean
specifically human germline genetic modification. Defined by the writers of the
report Human Germline Genetic Modification: Issues and Optionsfor Policymakers for
the Genetics and Public Policy Center, germline HGE refers to "techniques that
would attempt to create a permanent inheritable genetic change in offspring and
future descendents by altering the genetic makeup of the human germline."i In the
course of our discussion, we will isolate what makes this practice distinct from
similar ones in genetics.
The code that maps an organism's genetic makeup is called a genome.2 The
genome reduces to DNA,comprising four chemical signalers called nucleotides that
are repeated in a sequence. The nucleotides are abbreviated with the letters A,T,C,
and G. The order of these as they are repeated many millions of times directs the
enzymes inside an organism's cells in the production of proteins, which serve a

Susannah Baruch et al., Human Germline Genetic Modification: Issues and Optionsfor Policymakers
(Genetics and Public Policy Center, 2005), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/
Reports/Genetics_and_Public_Policy/HumanGermrmeGeneticMod.pdf, p 9.
^/b/d, p 11.
2

disease is when there are multiple abnormalities in genes that then interact with the
environment.^ This is the least understood role that genetics play in disease, and
related ailments include diabetes, most cancers, and heart disease.
These are the sorts of medical problems that our genes sometimes cause for
ns, but scientists have developed techniques besides HGE to fight these harmful
genetic alterations.^ In vitro fertilization (IVF) is a procedure where sperm and egg
cells, sex cells from males and females respectively, are clinically added together
and the resulting fertilized embryo is implanted into a woman's uterus for
development. Combining IVF with genetic testing of the embryos before
iniplantation yields pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). PGD effectively
screens out embryos with genomes that test positive for a given disease and thus
are considered defective. This way, parents have been able to ensure that their
children will not have the disease that they have tested the embryos for. Another
option some might consider is testing the developing fetus while already in the
uterus of the mother through amniocentesis, collecting and testing the amniotic
fluid, and aborting the pregnancy if the fetus tests positive for the disease.
HGE could have the same effect of influencing the genome of the next
generation as the above procedures but achieve it through fundamentally different
means. Instead of genetic control through in utero testing and abortion or PGD and
embryo screening, HGE preserves the embryo that tests positive for a disease by
restoring it to proper function. The two former procedures that are already in use

^ Ibid, p 13.
® Ibid.
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fundamentally dispose of diseased embryos while HGE fundamentally preserves
them.
HGE works by testing embryos(or the sex cells before fertilization) for
genetic disease. Should disease be found,the doctors would insert new DNA into
the genome of the embryo. The techniques that could effect this would be adapted
from somatic genetic modification^, stem cell research, and animal testing.^
Theoretically, a few different methods could modify the genome in a way
classifiable as HGE.^ First, replacing the mutated portion of the gene with a normal
one would correct the defective gene. Second, scientists could insert a DNA
sequence to activate or deactivate an existing gene. This would particularly be
useful when a gene triggers production of a protein that is harming the body.
Inserting a certain DNA sequence before the gene would signal to the cell to turn off
production of the enzyme. Third, one could add a whole new gene to a genome.
Researchers have demonstrated this method by inserting a gene into goldfish that
cause them to glow a florescent green color. For humans, possibilities would range
from inserting a gene that confers resistance to a virus to a gene that increases
muscle mass.
There are also a variety of techniques that could get the newly engineered
DNA into the embryo.io The first technique involves taking a virus and removing its
capacity to cause a disease while retaining its ability to invade and infect cells with

’Somatic genetic modification is genetic engineering done in adult organisms in response to a disease.
Since the engineered genes only exist in cells localized to the area relevant to curing the disease and not
the sex cell-producing organs, the engineered DNA would not be inheritable to offspring.
® Ibid.
® Ibid.
^°lbid,p 14.
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Homologous recombination presents a hope for overcoming some of these
challenges.i2 It is a way to target where a new gene gets inserted into a genome.
The engineered gene is designed to be nearly identical all along the DNA strand to
the mutated gene except for the abnormal part. In theory, the two strands
effectively swap places, precisely placing the new DNA into the spot of the old,
defective DNA. This targeting technique has been successful in mice and when done
on stem cells for use in somatic genetic engineering. It should be noted that these
techniques require testing on human stem cells and embryos before any attempt is
made to bring an engineered human to term. This testing carries with it
tremendous ethical questions, none of which I am interested in discussing in this
thesis. If these issues may be resolved, allowing research to move forward,then my
thesis will provide a theory for how we ought to use the technology that we have
perfected.
Now with the technical aspects including methods and limitations put aside,
we are able to cover the couple of reasons one might choose to utilize HGE.i^ The
first reason is therapeutic/medical: HGE could be used to cure or lessen the severity
of a genetic disease. One example is the replacement of the faulty BRCAl gene with
a normal one to prevent the possibility of breast cancer. The second reason is
"enhancement," or cosmetic. Examples would be to add or influence characteristics
such as eye color, intelligence, or height. In principle, these are the two different
reasons to utilize HGE; however some uses blur the line between medicinal and
cosmetic. According to the Genetics and Public Policy Center, an example of such an
Ibid, p 18.
Ibid,p 13.
7

ambiguous rationale would be adding a gene to an embiyo's chromosome to give
resistance to an infectious disease. It is an improvement for the sake of health but
still not simply correcting harmful genes. It goes beyond returning the body to
normal function and instead invents new traits. Reasonable people may disagree
about which purpose is more pronounced.
The most feasible use of HGE would be to cure "single-gene disorders" like
cystic fibrosis.i"^ This could theoretically eradicate such diseases in a family by
permanently replacing the harmful gene with a normal one that will then be
inherited by all offspring. Using HGE to introduce whole new genes and prevent
multi-gene disorders is much less feasible, as these likely involve more complicated
techniques. With our background knowledge sufficient, we are ready for our task.

14

Ibid, p 14.
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II. THESIS AND PRELIMINARY CONCERNS
Given the distinction between medicinal and cosmetic HGE,I propose that we
should hold that it is ethical to utilize HGE to prevent known medical diseases
and/or defects and unethical to do so for cosmetic reasons. In the following two
chapters I will proceed to justify this guideline by testing it against two of the most
influential ethical theories in philosophy, Kantian ethics and utilitarianism.
However, it is necessary to address a few things before we continue.
HGE is not doable at this time. Trials in animals have been unreliable in both
effectiveness and safety to the animal. Even with somatic HGE,where the
alterations in the genome are done only to a relatively few number of cells in a fully
developed human,there have been deadly consequences. Clinical trials using
somatic HGE to treat the "bubble boy" disease (X-chromosome linked severe
immunodeficiency) led to three patients developing leukemia as a side effect.^^
Given the safety risks and technical barriers to overcoming them,it isn't clear when
or even if germline HGE will be safe enough to test on human embryos. It is certain
that the techniques to be used must be perfected on animals and in somatic cells
before such a possibility is on the table. The thesis of the paper fully rests upon the
significant assumption that HGE is a) successful in the overwhelming number of
cases and b) done with all reasonable guarantee of safety. Therefore, the purpose of

Baruch, p 21.
9

this paper is not to wade through the inherent risks to changing the natural genome,
but instead to address theoretically the more provocative question; "if we could
safely will the design of a person's genome, how should we wield this power?
Thus, the recommendation of this paper is that if we are never able to reach the
point that we can safely and successfully carry out the goals of HGE, we ought never
to utilize it. The fact remains that we must be prepared should our ingenuity exceed
our expectations yet again.
My proposed guideline suggests that therapeutic HGE is distinctive from
cosmetic HGE. Truthfully, a depiction of the goals of HGE (e.g. prevent disease,
increase height) may more resemble a sliding scale between the two extremes than
two separate boxes. Conceptually, the difference is as clear as that between tall and
short. However, the borderline between the two is vague. This is partly because the
distinction between medical and cosmetic uses of HGE carries a normative
assumption that cosmetic factors do not influence "normal" human functioning like
medical ones do. People may disagree about what ought to be considered normal
human functioning. It may also be genuinely uncertain whether a condition is
merely cosmetic or actually has medical significance. However,it is better to leave
this classification to more qualified individuals. 1 will not attempt to set out specific
ways to distinguish between which cases ultimately fall into the medical or cosmetic
category. Whereas this paper is meant to cast a guiding principle and not a detailed
policy, 1 also will not stipulate how these judgments might be made or enforced. It
would be best for us first to deal with the central cases and only after these are
settled move on to the more difficult ones. To tackle these difficult cases, the idea is
10

that a hypothetical regulative body will adopt the thesis of this paper and use it as a
guide in creating policies on the use of HGE on humans. The body will uphold the
spirit of ethical HGE in dictating the specifics of application. This body will require
the expertise of physicians, ethicists, researchers, and many more to determine
whether or not a genetic alteration will correct irregular functioning of the mind or
body. Therefore 1 have limited my scope to a lower pay grade.
1 firmly believe that if we are to open the door to genetic engineering, we
must only go so far to permit it for parents that choose it, and not require it for all. 1
will show why Kant and Bentham would make HGE only permissible in some cases,
not obligatory. Just as charity is considered moral and certainly permissible but
usually not obligatory due to the fact that no one can demand recognition ofsome
correlative right, so it shall be with human genetic engineering.
I would expect that many will object to the very idea of HGE at all for
different reasons. Before arguing my specific proposition, I will first address
general objections to HGE to open the way for discussion. Ronald Dworkin provides
a recitation of several such objections.i^ The first of these is that the possible
mistakes that could happen make HGE prohibitively dangerous. As I have
previously stated, until we can proceed with all reasonable confidence that such
procedures are safe, we should not take advantage of HGE. However,there is reason
to believe that in time HGE will become as safe as other common procedures that
were once deemed dangerous. Second,some say that since HGE would likely be
very expensive, it gives the wealthy an unfair advantage, thus making HGE a social
Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality {Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2000), p 439.
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justice issue. However,the very nature of HGE is that it produces a permanent
change in the human genome. This means that after the first generation of
engineered humans,each successive generation will benefit from the results for free
via normal sexual reproduction.^^ Additionally, while HGE will probably be
expensive when it is first made available, like all other things it will become more
affordable in time and therefore more widely available. If HGE is shown to be very
effective, insurance companies would even have an incentive to pay for it since it
would lower the number of people with chronic diseases, the most expensive ones
to cover. Any possible social injustice will be very short lived. The next objection is
a fear that with HGE we will all become overly homogenized,losing the variety that
many value in humanity. This is not a problem that I believe medicinal HGE would
create. Fewer people facing genetic disease would only lead to more healthy and
thriving people. This could remain a good objection to cosmetic HGE, however.
Finally, Dworkin notes the often cited objection that to engineer the human
genetic code is an attempt to "play God," an authority that is inherently immoral for
humans to wield. The problem with this objection is that it leaves vague what
exactly is too "unnatural" for humans to do. It is certainly unnatural to take aspirin
for a headache,and undergo dialysis when one's kidneys fail. Why is there little
objection to these things? As J. Harris and G. Testa wrote in Science magazine, all of
medicine is a "comprehensive attempt to frustrate the course of nature."^^ If we
pick up the thread that we ought to leave life and death powers to God,then we

David Masci,"Designer Human: Will altering human genes divide society?" CQ Researcher Online Vol.
11-19 (2001), http://0-library.cqpress.com.umiss.lib.olemiss.edu/cqresearcher/cqresrre2001051800.
Baruch, p 35.
12

must surrender our entire healthcare system or fail to be consistent. If there is
something particularly spooky about using technology to engineer the biochemical
sequence that shapes part of our nature,then Dworkin has a strong response to this
concern. He says that it is not the fear of doing wrong, but the fear of"losing grip"
19

on what is right and wrong,

We are afraid of losing our current background

against which we determine our ethics. Our background is the lot that we are given
in life. We base our conception of right behavior on this background. For instance.
if our background were that humans typically lived for a thousand fruitful years.
then we would be much more disinclined to take risks with our lives than if we lived
but a fraction of that span. When our background changes,it destabilizes our grip
on what is right. Dworkin cites the moral uncertainty after splitting the atom; when
we suddenly wield the power to destroy entire cities in a breath,then the rules of
just war must change. Similarly, if people can will the genetic code of other people,
this change in our background could destabilize our distinction between chance and
choice, a foundation of our morality. While currently those born with genetic
defects clearly have none to blame,if HGE could prevent these defects,then the
moral responsibility of the parents is more uncertain. Such a dramatic change in
background is so frightening that it urges some to deciy that it is somehow "playing
God," whatever that may mean. However,this is not reason enough to halt progress.
Morality itself will not change, only the demands on our ability to behave morally.
We must accept the challenge to reexamine our beliefs against an ever-changing
background. It is not the sin of hubris, but the virtue of courage to do so.

Dworkin, R. p 446.
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One last reason for wholesale rejection of HGE comes from advocates for the
disabled.2o They draw parallels between HGE and the practices of Hitler and others
who committed unspeakable violence for the sake of eugenics. While HGE might
strictly fit the definition of eugenics that one may find in a dictionary,it certainly
doesn't warrant the connotations that come with the term eugenics. HGE would not
be used to give preference to any race or color and would not encourage or
discourage others to have children. HGE,if done solely for medical reasons, does
not imply that one race's genes are any better than another. It is the disease and the
individual's health that are the focus, not a race or culture's composition. Still,
spokesmen for disabilities groups decry HGE as trying to eliminate disabled people.
However,from one perspective, HGE is better than present practices of PGD
screening and rejection of embryos with harmful genes.21 HGE would not reject the
person because of his expected disability but instead preserve them by preventing
their hardship. The parents would have the option of eliminating a disease for the
sake of the child, not eliminating a group of people because they are a detriment to
society. To believe anything else would be disruptively cynical.
Now that we have addressed objections that say HGE is unethical altogether,
we have finally opened the door to arguing for the proposition. The remainder of
the thesis will rise to this task. While I recite and employ both Kantian ethics and
utilitarianism in making my case, it is not my intention to assert that either one is
true. I merely hope that these two great approaches will give credibility to my own
when they show that it is valid. Should we,in the course of ethical dialogue.
20

Baruch, p 34.
Ibid, p 36.
14

determine once and for all that one theory or the other is correct, we can simply
throw out the contrary chapter of this thesis and the work will lose no strength. The
strength of this strategy in arguing for my proposition is that it opens debate with
more ethicists. By not endeavoring to assert one theory or the other, I do not shut
out deontologists who follow Kant or consequentialists who follow Bentham but
instead speak to them on their own terms.

15

III. KANT AND THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
Our first ethical theory is from Immanuel Kant and insists that morality
derives from reason alone.22 People are able to react to their surroundings with
animalistic inclinations and higher practical reason. Inclinations include our goals
and desires. From our experiences we learn prudence,the best ways to satisfy our
inclinations. These are constructive when used to solve non-moral problems. One's
inclination when hungry is to eat. However,if we wish to transcend the prudential
and diagnose the moral we must make use of our a priori knowledge. This type of
knowledge is that which we do not derive from experience, but only our pure
reason, and then apply to experience. For example, we do not need to conduct an
experiment to see that an equilateral triangle must at the same time be an
equiangular triangle because our theoretical reason makes this apparent. In the
same way, our practical reason yields morality.
In discovering what the supreme moral law must be, according to Kant we
begin by observing that there is no good thing without qualification except the good
will.^^ Good will is so pure in its goodness that it is to be valued in-itself absolutely.
For clarification,"the will is nothing but practical reason,"24 that aforementioned

22

Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: University
Press, 1997), p 3.
23
Ibid, p 7.
24
Ibid, p 24.
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faculty that takes the supreme moral principle and carries it out into practical
action. It is the nature of the good will to obey the moral law over mere inclination;
this gives it its intrinsic worth. In fact, good will is so important that even if it were
unable to effect its intentions it would still have its full value.^s Being so valuable in
itself, the inability to carry out anything does not subtract at all from its worth. If it
did, then Kant’s ethic would be at least partially consequentialist, which it decidedly
is not.
So what precisely makes a will good? A will is good if it does its duty for the
sake of its duty.^^ Morally worthy actions come from reason and not desire. If it is
wrong to commit suicide to avoid misery, it is always wrong to commit suicide for
this reason no matter how much the person desires relief. It should not be assumed,
however,that any action in accordance with duty is a morally worthy action. If one
chooses not to commit suicide, but does so because her life is highly pleasurable,it is
not moral (or immoral,for that matter)for her to resist ending her life. This is
because her inclinations, not her practical reason, guided her actions. On the other
hand, if a man is miserable and longsuffering to the point that he would be better
served to die and be at peace than to continue in his dark existence, and yet he
continues to endure each new day out of moral conviction that human life has
inherent worth, this is clearly an action done out of duty and even contrary to
inclination. It is possible to satisfy desires and at the same time behave morally, but
what is in question is the motive of the agent. In instances concerning morality, the
will would always act as reason deemed objectively necessary if it were thoroughly
25

Ibid, p 8.
Ibid,p 11.
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good. However, it is human nature for inclinations to tempt people away from
acting reasonably.27

jg vvhat causes immoral motives that are against our

better nature. Kant formally states duty essentially by saying that since an action
niust be done for duty's sake to have moral worth,it is not in the success of the
action but in the motive to follow the moral law that we find moral behavior.28
As it has been stated that morally worthy behavior is derived from practical
reason, the idea of duty, the moral necessity to obey moral law,is only known to
29

rational beings. Only rational beings are therefore capable of having a good will.

From this we realize two important things: first that only rational beings, persons,
can be judged for behaving morally or immorally;3o and second that persons are the
only things that possess the capacity for intrinsic good,good will, and they therefore
are themselves intrinsically valuable. The latter will be discussed later.
Finally we are ready to behold what Kant says is the only supreme moral
principle. He calls it the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is so
named because it is absolutely valuable in itself and not contingent on any
conditions. If a hypothetical imperative is stated as "If you want X, do Y," then the
categorical imperative is simply "Do Y." Imperatives are commands. If an objective
principle of reason demands a certain action, then it is a command.^i The
categorical imperative can be formulated in different ways, but each way means the
same thing, according to Kant. The first formulation is stated as "I ought never to act

Ibid, p
Ibid,p
29
Ibid, p
30
Ibid, p
Ibid, p

28

24.
13.
14.
34.
24.
18

except in such a way that 1 could also will that my maxim should become a universal
law."32 This is necessarily derived from pure reason. Just as our reason tells us that
contradictions are irrational, so it is if our actions lead to contradictions of sorts. To
illustrate how the categorical imperative should guide our behavior, he imagines a
33

man who is tempted to make promises to others that he does not intend to keep.
If we stipulate that he lies so well that he will almost always be believed it would

certainly be prudent to his personal interests to lie. However, would it be against
his duty? Let us attempt to will that his personal maxim,"make false promises"
becomes universal law and see. It is apparent that everyone would be extremely
distrusting of one another and promises would lose all significance. Since an
assumption of the false promise is that the institution of promises exists, this leads
to a contradiction. Thus, we cannot consistently will that the lying man's personal
maxim become universal law and so to lie would be immoral. We should not
misunderstand that it is due to any negative consequences of lying; e.g., economic
losses of unpaid loans, that we reject the maxim. To do this would be
consequentialist. We must remember that the categorical imperative is a test done
with reason. The lying promise's assumption is contradicted when universally
willed.
Kant wrote that we can formulate the categorical imperative another way.
Since it has capacity for good will,"rational nature exists as an end in itself,"^^ with
intrinsic value and we should "so act that you use humanity, whether in your own

32

Ibid, p 15.
Ibid, p 15.
34
Ibid, p 37.

33

19

person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end,never
merely as a means,

35

If we treat others as a mere means,a way to obtain what we

want, then we disrespect their status as rational agents. Instead, we ought to
respect their own humanity and only use them as a means when they would consent
to be so used,so far as they are rational. Kant believes that when we allow
ourselves exceptions to the maxims that would violate the first categorical
imperative, e.g. lie while expecting others to keep their promises, we disrespect
others by merely using them as a means to what we want.^^ Thus,the two
formulations of the categorical imperative are linked.
Now with the understanding of the categorical imperative and the dutybased ethic that it establishes, we are ready to judge my thesis that we ought to will
HGE in cases of medical purpose and not in cases of cosmetic purpose. A peculiar
fact about the HGE issue is that the principle subject is not yet able to consent to
anything. This does not free us from moral responsibility, however, because she
represents a future person with full worth as a rational being. One may reject this
presupposition on the grounds that the potential to be a person alone does not
require that they be treated as though they are in fact a person. Truly,this is the
source of tremendous controversy as shown by the divisive abortion issue.
However, on the assumption that the embryo will be brought to term, which is
fundamentally the case with HGE, we are unquestionably morally responsible for
our behavior toward it. Our actions will have a profound impact on the wellbeing of

35
36

Ibid, p 38.
Ibid.
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IL

the person once it is born. We must act rightly by her and due to her inability to
give or refuse consent to HGE,it is incumbent upon us to act on her behalf.
The only logical way to act for an embryo is to typify a rational person and
predict to what such a person would consent and not consent. We use these
predictions to act as the consent(or refusal of consent) of the person-to-be.
Coincidentally, we already use this principle in society today. When a person is
comatose, a close relative or appointed friend is allowed to consent on his behalf for
treatments that a rational person would likely consent to receive. For further
support to this claim, Gerald Dworkin writes that such liberal paternalism,the
37

restriction of a person's liberty for his own benefit, is permissible in certain cases.

If a person would choose not to act in what is objectively his own interests due to a
failure in reason, then others are justified in compelling him to act likewise. This is
different from objectionable forms of paternalism, he says, because the restriction of
liberty is supremely in the principal subject's interests and not in that of others. The
way that we determine if an action is in a person's rational best interests is whether
or not he can obtain certain basic goods that anyone would desire regardless of
their goals. He says that "it is reasonable to suppose that there are 'goods' such as
health which any person would want to have in order to pursue his own good." An
example of justifiable paternalism is a mandate that all motorcycle riders wear
helmets. A cyclist behaving rationally would see that the small penalty in
convenience pales in comparison to the great incentive of enhanced security in the
event of an accident. Irrationally calculated cost/benefit analysis, along with

Gerald Dworkin, "Paternalism," The Monist Vol. 56, No. 1. (1973).
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ignorance and confused psychological states, sometimes makes us behave
irrationally. This principle justifies parents behaving paternalistically in subverting
the future liberty of their children while still embryos due to the fact that they are
not yet rational but would want health, a fundamental good,were they so. The
parents' decision is justified on the grounds of the assumption of retroactive
consent given by the children once they reach rational status. To make decisions
out of liberal paternalism is how best to responsibly treat the embryos if we are to
bring them to term.
At this time I would like to draw a distinction between the type of good that
health provides and the type that cosmetic features represent. Rational people
would universally desire good health for themselves. This is to say that they would
universally consent to receiving better health. They would universally consent to
being cured of a disease. Rational people would not, however, universally consent
to a given cosmetic enhancement. This is because the value of a given cosmetic
feature is very subjective. The feature that would bring happiness to one person
may not do so to another. Kant himself said that while the pursuit of happiness is an
inclination that all men possess, the "concept" of what constitutes happiness is
subjective.38 Some rational people prefer to be tall, short; blue eyed, brown eyed;
male,female. There is even significant reason to suspect whether every rational
person would desire to have a genius IQ when we consider that some of the world's
most intelligent people are also the most miserable. Summarily,since we cannot be
sure that a typical rational person would consent to receiving a given cosmetic

Kant, p 12.
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enhancement, we cannot presume to use HGE to give it to them. We can, however,
assume that they would consent to accepting HGE to be free of a terrible disease
because a typical rational person would do so.
One could not help but note that the reason many parents would desire to
make use of HGE for cosmetic reasons is because they desire to produce a designer
child for their own reasons. A father desires to produce a Heisman-winningson and
so engineers his DNA to increase the likelihood of this happening. This is of course
blatantly using his child as a mere means and not an end in himself. Even if the
father has the best of intentions of serving the child's interests, he unconsciously
projects his subjective values onto his son as though they were universal. We can
contrast this with medicinal HGE where the child is truly treated as an end in
himself due to receiving a universally valued thing.
My opponent might point out that cosmetic features often lead to non-genetic
medical disorders. An example is size, a cosmetic feature influenced by genetics,
which subjects the individual to ridicule to the point it causes depression. A skeptic
of my thesis might say that HGE that manipulates the expected size of an individual,
indirectly saving her from possible depression, would weaken the impermissibility
of cosmetic HGE,defeating the proposition. However,this argument rests
upon an
opinion of what size is ideal, a subjective determination, potentially causing
depression, a universal ill. Since the likelihood of this feature causing the illness is
i
dependent upon the individual's opinion of this feature, we cannot preemptively
change this feature for the sake of preventing the illness. To do so would mean to
risk acting against what that person might will for herself.
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One may additionally object that I am not true to Kantian ethics because I
distinguish medical and cosmetic goods by their expected consequences. While I am
basing much of this argument upon the observation that health conclusively leads to
happiness for the principal subject and cosmetic qualities do not, it should not be
thought that I am making consequentialist claims about what the ethical maxim for
HGE must be. Kant actually believes that we have an indirect duty to promote the
happiness of ourselves and others.^^ This is not because happiness has any moral
value, but because happiness enables people to be more ethical. A man preoccupied
with his own pain is less likely to act selflessly and exercise good will. Moreover, my
point is that when we make subjective "improvements" to a person without their
consent, we cannot possibly do so with their humanity as the supreme end.
However,that individual, no matter who it might be, would certainly consent to
being free from illness insofar as they were rational. Thus, while medicinal HGE
serves the child, cosmetic HGE is done out of the subjective wishes of the parents
who imperialistically project their conception of happiness on the child. The
respectful thing for parents to do is to allow their child to determine for themselves
what subjective goods are valuable and pursue them for themselves. This is the best
way to protect the rational beings that undergo HGE while at the same time
providing for them the universal good that a reasonable person would desire.
The preceding directly addresses the second formulation of the categorical
imperative, but what about the first, that we must be able universally to will our
maxim? There are no apparent flaws in universally willing medicinal HGE. Children

Ibid.
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could grow up to prosper without the limitations of disorders such as Down's
syndrome and cystic fibrosis. Some may raise the objection that with more people
surviving to live healthy lives, it would add to overpopulation problems on
the planet, stressing society as a whole and limiting resources for many things,
including HGE. This objection clearly defeats too much in order to stand as a
reasonable concern. If we place overpopulation fears above tangible personal
health issues, then we also have to deny all other treatments that prolong life, an
action that would justifiably outrage most anyone. Moreover,the benefits of HGE
would not only prolong life but improve the quality of life for many as well. If one
would assert that overpopulation is a significant objection,it does not defeat HGE
use for non-fatal, yet highly debilitating, diseases.
When we consider whether HGE done to subjectively enhance certain
features of a person can be universally willed, we see serious problems, however.
First, we should reassert the point made in a previous chapter that I argue that even
therapeutic HGE be only permissible, not obligatoiy.^o Therefore,the same standard
must apply to cosmetic HGE if we hypothesize universally willing the maxim the
same way. It is precisely here that we face the problem with this maxim. Willing
that parents can choose to use HGE to hand pick their children's cosmetic features
assumes that parents can choose the genetic lottery instead. Yet if generationn
performs HGE to make their children a certain way,then these children,
generationn+i, will not be able to opt-out from their own children having engineered
40

It is important to point out that the categorical imperative preserves the choice of the parents in
medical cases because the maxim is stated negatively. We ought to only use people when we
simultaneously respect their intrinsic worth. We are not obligated to always serve the ends of all people.
Thus, refusing to use HGE at ail is not unethical according to Kantian ethics.

25

genes. The changes will follow the next generation via normal sexual reproduction.
They will be unwillingly swept into the effects of HGE even if they didn't want to be.
They are shut out of the random process of nature with no way to return. The
parents of the second generation cannot choose the genetic lottery and therefore the
maxim's limitation to permissibility and not obligation isn't sustained after the first
generation. This produces a contradiction in the original maxim that would allow
parents to choose cosmetic HGE for their children. Therefore,we cannot universally
will the maxim that one can use HGE to cosmetically enhance their child and
preserve the choice for future parents.
A way to encapsulate my arguments that medicinal HGE is permissible along
Kantian grounds while cosmetic HGE is not, is to say that the latter amounts to
genetic slavery. It arbitrarily deprives a person of the freedom to choose his own
fate. A person steps in to force upon a rational being what relative goods they
should value. While non-engineered people cannot choose these things for
themselves either, their freedom is restrained by nature,

not man. The categorical

imperative can only guide the actions of rational man,not the genetic lottery While
it therefore does not make sense to say that nature

has acted wrongly by giving us a

feature that we do not want, because nature can't will

to make us in its image it

makes perfect sense to say that another person has wronged us by doing the same
thing. Medicinal HGE, however, only gives us what we would want anyway and is
more comparable to giving CPR to an unconscious person than enslaving a free man.
Now we have performed a thorough analysis of Kantian ethics and how it
would evaluate the thesis. We see that the fundamental
26

difference between

L

medicinal and cosmetic HGE,that universally held good follows the former and
person-dependent good follows the latter, is the deciding issue in determining
whether each passes the test of the categorical imperative. The engineered person's
interests are fully considered only in therapeutic engineering. In fact,the person's
interests cannot even be defined in cosmetic engineering and should not be
presumed. Having completed the discussion that centers on Kantian ethics, we are
ready to move on to the next ethical theory.
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IV. HEDONISTIC UTILITARIANISM
Utilitarianism is another theory that is influential among philosophers that
study ethics. Interestingly, the very foundation of utilitarianism is contrary to that
of our previous ethical theory, Kantian ethics. This ethical system is
consequentialist, measuring the moral worth of an action by the action's
consequences and not by the motive of the agent of action. Put another way,while
Kantianism is marked by a categorical imperative, utilitarianism is noted for its
hypothetical imperative. By this I mean that no action is considered ethical or good
in and of itself, but only so within the context of the results of said action. A
hypothetical imperative takes the form of"If you want X,do Y." In utilitarianism,the
X exclusively concerns the predicted outcome of action Y. The X identifies for us
what holds the value for which we strive. As we explore utilitarianism, we will
understand what this theory values above all else and sets as the goal for our every
action. Then, after we establish this standard of action, we will use it to evaluate this
paper's thesis concerning the use of HGE.
It is the belief of every good utilitarian that happiness is an intrinsic good and
is to be valued in its own right. One of the preeminent utilitarian theorists is Jeremy
Bentham,and he defines happiness in a very specific way. He observed that "Nature
has placed mankind under the governance
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of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure/'^i This is an assertion of what as a
niatter of fact, in the writer's view, motivates human behavior: striving for
happiness identified as pleasure. To believe in this assertion is to be a psychological
hedonist. This means simply that the primary motivation for all humans is the
pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Bentham writes that this brings us to
both normative and descriptive claims about life. Pleasure and pain determine not
only what we ought to do, but also what we shall do. We should spend time with
those that we love because this brings us happiness. Moreover, we shall spend time
with them because we will follow our psychological drive to be happy. At the same
time, we will seek heat in the dead of winter because we should minimize our
experience of pain and inevitably we shall do so, provided there isn't a more
pleasurable alternative. While there is some tension in the fact that Bentham
delivers his hedonism in prescriptive form while also claiming that we can’t avoid
pursuing pleasure, we can still proceed with his normative theory without accepting
his assertion that we are all psychological hedonists. Also, psychological hedonism
is not necessarily joined with psychological egoism. Our motivation to pursue
pleasure is not limited to our own,but that of all others as well. While there are
some who selfishly pursue their own hedonistic fulfillment, it is not

necessarily so

that we all do so. Summarily, it is the inborn goal of people to see pleasure
increased in the world. Were it not, it should be our chosen goal. This i
IS a very
common sense conclusion that makes this ethical theory very accessible to even the
casual student of ethics. It is simple and appeals to a basic feeling of all
41

people.

Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford'
Clarendon Press,
1907), I.
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It must be readily obvious by now that according to utilitarianism the ethical
action is one that makes people happy. Indeed, this is the core of the philosophy and
is formally stated as the Principle of Utility which "approves or disapproves of every
action whatsoever according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or
diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the
same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness."^^

for

Bentham,the maximization of total net happiness for all involved parties is the goal
of ethics. He envisions that we can achieve this by calculating the pleasures on one
side of a scale and the pains on another side of the scale and so act when the
pleasures outweigh the pains. This is a standard that we very often employ in
democracy; e.g., passing progressive tax laws and funding public schools and
transportation. Some of the most wealthy among us naturally suffer by paying
higher taxes, but the pain that they feel is mitigated by the vast resources that
remain after taxation. For the cost of this relatively small pain, governments build
public infrastructure that produce vast amounts of happiness for many more people.
It is no coincidence that democratic prescriptions would coincide with utilitarian
ones because one aspect of utilitarianism is that it is purely egalitarian. No
individual man's pleasure is more important than another's. The king's sore toe is
no more deserving of medical attention than the pauper's. However, unlike some
forms of egalitarianism, collective happiness is the intrinsic good and there is no
regard for natural rights. The wealthy have no rights to property if the
redistribution of their property is expected to yield a greater total net happiness.
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There are safeguards against hedonism gone-wild and the decadent
satisfaction of our base desires. While all pleasures are qualitatively equd\,there are
noted quantitative differences between the pleasures this world has to offer. We
can measure this quantitative value of pleasures in a variety of ways,including
intensity, duration, likelihood, purity, and extent.*^^ 'Thus, we discriminate between
an hour eating candy, with impure (leads to pain in excess) and temporary pleasure,
and an hour reading classic literature, which provides pure and lasting pleasure.
Additionally, although the killing and mugging of one man may bring pleasure to
many thieves, the profound, lasting grief of the man's family far outweighs the
financial gain of the thieves. Another addendum to the Principle of Utility is that it is
not necessary that "this process [of quantifying pleasure] be strictly pursued
previously to every moral judgment" but simply that the process should be "kept in
view."'^^ This allows us

to create rules based upon prior analyses of the likely

hedonistic implications of actions and use these rules as our system of ethics To
behave morally, one need not consider all of the pleasurable and painful
implications if they were to lie, but instead remember

the rule that lying generally

leads to suffering. This type of utilitarianism is called Rule Utilitarianism
Bentham remarks that we ought to remember not those that are rational, but
those that can suffer, when we discuss ethical obligation.'^s He asserts that it is our
common ability and desire to feel happiness that give us moral
worth. Therefore
we behave morally when we act to promote the happiness for all those included

Ibid, IV.
Ibid, VI.
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We can now use the Principle of Utility as another standard by which we can judge
the proposition. This is of significant benefit to us as we make our case for
medicaiiy directed HGE because the consequentiaiists can then be welcomed into
our happy band of bioengineering optimists,though they reject the previous
argument's motive-based imperatives.
Remember that the proposition we are to hold to the greatest pleasure
principle is that HGE ought to be used only when it is done with the sole and explicit
purpose of preventing disease or defect to the unborn person. Since this is a rule
that we use to apply in all cases of the practice called genetic engineering,we must
clearly embrace the form of utilitarianism that allows

us to make general principles

upon which we can base decisions. The weakness of this approach is that it does not
allow us to make case by case analyses to determine howto increase total net
happiness in each case. This weakness is offset by the pragmatic strength in
having
a principle by which a person, regardless of his intelligence or time to meditate on
their decision,can determine what is likely to produce the desired effect,

happiness.

With this strength in hand, we can remain confident that if rule utilitarian!sm
upholds our proposition, then it testifies to the ethical strength therein.
Our first duty in asserting our proposition with utilitarian support IS
i to
affirm that HGE done for medical reasons is permissible. We will save the
arguments for exclusion of cosmetic reasons for later. Now,it is a plain observation
made by any reasonable person that we experience pleasure from good health and
pain from poor health. There are of course the bizarre cases of the masochists and
similarly deranged individuals; however they must be excluded from this
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conversation that pertains to the common human mind or else we will be unable to
engage in more interesting discussion. The typical person spends time and energy
seeking things that will bring him good health. Diet books fly off of the shelves at
local bookstores, the latest home fitness innovations are ordered late at night from
television infomercials and billions of dollars are spent in this country alone on
medical care all for the sake of giving us a better standard of health. Yet it doesn't
make utilitarian sense to say that good health is valued in its own right, but rather
we should note that it serves to bring us pleasure. Evidence ofthis is that people
often view their pleasure goals short-sightedly and indulge in unhealthy habits. It is
only when these temporary pleasures either wear off or lead to later pain that we
suddenly hold good health in greater esteem. This happens because we have
learned that health provides a more pure and lasting happiness than the sweet
snacks and comfortable reclining chairs that stand in opposition to our fitness. And
here we have identified something important about a high standard of health: not
only is it conducive to pleasure, but the pleasure that it brings is on par
quantitatively better than unhealthy pleasures. Thus,when the principle of utility
demands that we act to provide the most pleasure, we can see that the healthy
option is better than the unhealthy (as well as non-healthy) option because of its
pure and permanent nature.
A second observation that has been made through modern scientific
discovery is that a wide range of diseases that attack human health are rooted in
genetics. In the duality of nature vs. nurture, genetics vs. environment, nature has
the ability to bite at us in ways that environment, with its communicable and
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lifestyle-mediated diseases cannot. One of the classic examples of genetic disease is
hemophilia. Even the royal pedigrees of Europe were affected by a disease that can
be passed on to future generations whenever there is at least a mother carrying the
gene for the disease. Examples of diseases of this type abound and many diseases
that we face today may unexpectedly be traced back to our DNA as well. Thus,this
observation shows us that genetics often lead to poor health and from the previous
observation it is clear that increased pain and suffering follow.
At this point I may not have said anything that is deeply controversial or
engaging, but it is necessary to prepare us for the next observation,that genetic
engineering holds the promise of curing genetic diseases before they have the
chance to cause anyone pain. Earlier in this thesis 1 detailed the scientific
ma
background of HGE i
way that has made it plain how thoroughly effective this
technology could become with greater research. With this fact we have arrived at
our desired conclusion; that HGE will lead to vast pleasure. We can
state this briefly
in a concise form:

13

Good health leads to pleasure, poor health to pain

2]

Genetic diseases exist and lead to poor health
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Human Genetic Engineering can prevent genetic disease

Therefore, HGE can create better health and decrease pain.
When one considers the enormous toll that genetic disease takes on

humanity,from

sickle-cell anemia to Huntington's disease, it is difficult to imagine just h
ow much
utility could be provided by successful use of HGE for medical reasons

In our

balance sheet of pleasure and pain, things to be entered into the pleasur
® column
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include children who arc able to grow,learn, and participate normally with other
children, increased lifespan, greater potential to succeed in endeavors, as well as
less resources spent treating genetic diseases for generation after generation. Also
staggering is how much pain is prevented in these cases; parents and loved ones do
not mourn for sick children, the children themselves do not suffer physical pain,
defect, or mental illness, and difficult decisions of genetic disease carriers about
whether to have children or abort pregnancies out offear of propagating the disease
are averted. By taking each of these benefits of HGE and multiplying them by the
number of diseases that would be prevented for the rest of human existence, we can
see how seriously we stand to increase total net happiness'^^
It is apparent that HGE carries significant potential for abuse. If the principle
of utility determines how we ought to use HGE in each case, then some may fear that
their own interests may be harmed in the name of the collective good. For this
reason, it may be useful to establish some non-natural rights, based fully upon
generalized hedonic calculus, to promote the feeling that the interests of people and
their offspring will be protected when it comes to HGE. Such man-made rules might
effectively bring a sense of security that goes a long way in maximizing net utility in
its own right. However, 1 believe that these rights would merely formalize the rules
that are already apparent in the argument.
At this time it is appropriate to offer criticisms that a skeptic might offer to
this argument. I will recite such possible criticisms,following each one immediately
46

It is admittedly more difficult to assert via utilitarianism that medicinal HGE is only perm/ss/We and not
obligatory, but when one considers the frustrated pain of parents who cannot choose to opt of out of HGE
because they are compelled to use it on their children, this adds significant suffering and prevents us from
being able to say that medicinal HGE would increase the total net happiness of the family.
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with my answer in defense of the argument. First, one may reprise the
overpopulation objection for the utilitarianism theory and say that medicinal HGE
would cause people to live longer, leading to overpopulation and significant
correlative pain. This objection is a valid one, as the effects of overpopulation could
become so intense that it leads to a prohibitively high volume of pain. However,it is
extremely difficult to predict this far-fetched outcome. Overpopulation would have
to be extreme indeed to outweigh the physical, emotional, and mental pleasures that
universal better health would provide. We might look at how Bentham quantifies
pleasure to assess this possible pain. Upon our assessment, we see that the
unlikelihood of this amount of pain occurring weakens the pain and our obligation
to act to avoid this pain. He would say that the pain is remote while the pleasure is
probable, related to propinquity, making the pleasure greater in the hedonic
calculus. Without some sophisticated way to project how medicinal HGE will affect
population sizes, crowding, and the effect of these things on limited

resources,this

objection remains shaky, given the uncertainty of the calculations.
Secondly, one may say that therapeutic HGE fails to produce more net
pleasure than pain by giving what I'll call the Van Gogh objection.

Some say that it

was Van Gogh's mental illness that led him to create beautiful works of art thatare
cherished long after his death. They argue that the happiness that this art caused to
Van Gogh and others is greater than the pain that he suffered to produce it and
therefore HGE to prevent his anxiety and depression
possible to do so) would have been the wrong thing

(if it were hypothetically

to do according to the principle

of utility. I find that this objection rests upon a lot of groundless speculation It
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cannot be proven that the mental illness increased the quality ofVan Gogh's
artv^ork. It is possible that his frustration prevented him from creating even more
inspiring paintings than "Wheat Fields with Crows. Moreover,there was no way to
predict that Van Gogh would become such an accomplished artist Even if we can
prove that his mental illness directly caused his talent, such illness does not always
produce unusual talent. Given this fact, we would not rationally want to inflict all
people with depression in order to empower them to be great artists. This extreme
example shows us yet again that the chance of the relevant pleasures and pains
occurring is very important. Even if the Van Gogh objection has an accurate
foundation, it is far more likely that only the pain will follow a given person all of his
life instead of the accompanying artistic talent, ^^^ere is plenty of potential for pain
in the world apart from genetically caused mental illness to inspire similar art
Therefore, the objection fails to show we ought not risk losing some aesthetic
pleasures to good mental health.
A final objection to my thesis is that it interrupts the natural process of
evolution, possibly leading to negative effects; i.e.

curing one genetic disease leaves

humans ill-prepared for environmental changes for which evolution
adapting them. We evade this problem by pointing out

already

that environmental change

for which evolution adapts us occur over hundreds of thousands if not millions of
years. It is not likely that medicinal HGE today will produce irreversible
consequences for humanity many millennia from now. Even the technique of
genetic engineering will be vastly improved by the time that severe

environ mental

threats to humans surface. Using HGE to adapt us for survival, amidst clear and
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present environmental danger, in lieu of evolution would seem to presentno
negative consequences other than inconvenience. Admittedly,this is a borderline
case where it is unclear whether the HGE would be medical or cosmetic. In any case
this is another weak appeal to a distant danger of HGE.
To complete my task of using the principle of utility to validate my thesis, I
still must argue that cosmetic HGE leads to greater pain than pleasure. There are
several problems that arise when we open the door to cosmetic HGE and each one
leads to such pain that we could not ethically permit that genetic engineering be
used for non-medical purposes. Beginning with the complications ofsex selection,
we see that male children are often preferred to female children. Cultures such as
that in China have used techniques other than HGE to produce tens of millions more
boys than girls in the most recent generation. HGE would have the same effects and
therefore would produce many lonely men who would have no option to many and
have families of their own. The pain that this produces is quite considerable.
Another problem with cosmetic enhancement is that it places pressure on
the child to live up to the expectations of her parents. A mother and father want to
raise a successful honor student who will pursue an Ivy League education and so
manipulate the child s genes to raise her expected IQ. Her parents expectations are
SO clear and so

emphatic that the child can not help but feel that she has let down

her parents if she fai,3 to live up to these expectations. Sure enough,the girl,
whether for
●Gutters of preference

or non-genetic factors that inhibit hcr parents'

dreams, does
satisfy her parents' desires. She then must carry the burden of her
failure With herallofher life. She migWeven wonderifshewerethechildthath er
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if her parents love her in light of
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her inadequacy 'I’lie tremendous pain that

she feels is as obvious as the
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We have now concluded our discussion of utilitarianism and how it would
evaluate the
not im

Pi'oposition that HGE is ethically permissible in cases of medical need

^^ses of cosmetics. We have used the principle of utility and found that
for not

^‘‘^dicinai
p roduces pure, immediate, certain, and long-lasting pleasure
°‘i>y the

but many others as well. The many pains ofcosmetic genetic
that it would also

^^gineeri
lio wever, trump any impure and uncertain pleasures
Produ ce.

40

A

CONCLUSION
The problem of determining how to use the technology that we are
developing will not go away on its own. We must boldly accept the challenge to
formulate some guidelines on the ethical use ofgenetic engineering on human
embryos. Pursuant to this challenge, we have reviewed the science of HGE to learn
that it fundamentally preserves an embryo that tests positive for a genetic disease
and then seeks to correct the dangerous gene with artificially created DNA. The
DNA then becomes a permanent and inheritable part of the person's genome. We
have also considered what use of HGE should be considered morally permissible. It
is hopeful that with the proper principle in place, a regulative body could enforce
policies that uphold the spirit of ethical genetic engineering. I have defended the
proposition that we can ethically use HGE only for medical reasons and never for
cosmetic ones. By evaluating this claim against two ofthe most influential
comprehensive ethical theories in philosophy, Kantian ethics and utilitarianism, we
have given all due rigor to testing our theory for validity. For if such radically
different theories arrive at the same conclusion, it increases the strength ofthe
conclusion. With one final warning that such a powerful technology should only be
wielded with all reasonable assurance of safety, we have completed our task.
Hopefully this work has not only settled an important issue of the 21st century, but
emboldened us to tackle even more.
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